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Abstract
We investigate the impact of alternative certifying institutions on ﬁrms’ incentives to
engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities as well as their relative
market and societal implications. We ﬁnd that the CSR certiﬁcation standard is the lowest
under a for-proﬁt private certiﬁer and the highest under a Non Governmental Organization
(NGO), with the standard of a welfare maximizing public certiﬁer lying in between. Yet,
regarding industry output, this ranking is reversed. Certiﬁcation of CSR activities is welfare
enhancing for consumers and ﬁrms and thus should be encouraged. Finally, depending on
whether certiﬁcation takes place before or after ﬁrms’ CSR activities, a public certiﬁer and
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Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR hereafter), “a concept whereby companies integrate social
and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their
stakeholders on voluntary basis” (European Commission, 2001), has recently received large
publicity and has led many companies to account for the social consequences of their activities.1
In this context, consumers respond positively to the ﬁrms’ eﬀorts to become, or at least to
appear as, socially responsible, and ﬁrms beneﬁtf r o mt h e s ee ﬀorts.2
Porter and Kramer (2002; 2006) distinguish two types of CSR activities: (i) philanthropy
oriented donations, and (ii) investments in production technologies and business processes,
along the value chain.3 This paper focuses on CSR activities of the second type. CSR activities
of this type are diﬃcult - if not impossible - to be inferred by consumers, through search or
consumption. In this context, we argue that the socially responsible (SR henceforth) attributes
attached to products, through the ﬁrms’ CSR activities, are classiﬁed as a credence good.4
Hence, there is need for an information disclosure mechanism to credibly signal the ﬁrms’ CSR
eﬀorts to consumers. Certiﬁcation by a third party, verifying “the fulﬁllments of a ﬁrm to
certain criteria or standards” (Bottega and De Freitas, 2009), serves as such a mechanism.5
The present paper investigates the eﬀects of alternative certifying institutions on ﬁrms’
incentives to engage in costly CSR activities as well as their relative market and societal
1More than half of the top 100 corporations based in the 16 more industrialized countries published a CSR
report in the year 2005 (Becchetti et al., 2006). Tsoutsoura (2004) reports that “more than half of the Fortune
1000 companies issue CSR reports.”
2There is widespread evidence that consumers express a willingness to pay a premium for goods produced by
socially responsible ﬁrms (Cason and Gangadharan, 2001; Elfenbein and McManus, 2007; Hiscox and Smyth,
2006; Wasik, 1996). Regarding ﬁrms, there is evidence that spending on CSR activities has positive eﬀects on
their market performance (Baron et al., 2008; Harjoto and Jo, 2007a, 2007b; Vogel, 2005; Waddock and Graves,
1997; Posnikoﬀ, 1997).
3T h i si st h ec a s ew h e r eaﬁrm’s voluntary CSR activities are in line with the interests of its stakeholders
such as its employees (investing in health and safety in the workplace), suppliers (by supporting local suppliers
rather than cheaper alternative sources in order to support the local economy), and the environment (by reducing
emissions of pollutants or using environmentally friendly input). See for example Mayer (1999) and Bris and
Brisley (2006).
4Examples of such attributes contain the conditions under which a product is produced, including externalities
associated with production (e.g. pollution) as well as hidden hazards associated with consumption of the product.
See for instance, Calveras and Ganuza (2010a, 2010b).
5As Auriol and Schillizzi (2003) mention, “certiﬁcation may be deﬁned as a process whereby an unobservable
quality level of some product is made known to the consumer through some guarantee system, usually issued
by a third independent party. In other words, certiﬁcation is a process for transforming a credence attribute
into a search attribute”.
1implications. In particular, it addresses the following four questions.
First, what is the relative eﬀectiveness of alternative CSR certifying institutions on enhanc-
ing ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀort levels? This question has been motivated by the fact that there are private
(non-proﬁt and for-proﬁt) as well as public institutions certifying ﬁrms’ CSR activities.6
Second, do ﬁrms certiﬁed for their CSR activities perform better than those not certiﬁed?
What are the relative market outcomes of the alternative certifying institutions? The empirical
literature examining the eﬀects of certifying ﬁrms’ CSR activities on their market performance
is scant and does not oﬀer clear evidence.7
Third, what are the relative societal eﬀects of the alternative certifying institutions? Inter-
estingly, when CSR started becoming widespread, its further encouragement became a central
policy objective in both the U.S. and the E.U., aiming at promoting sustainable growth and
competitiveness (European Commission, 2001; 2006). Although their main objective is the
same, Doh and Guay (2006) argue that “diﬀerent institutional structures and political lega-
cies in the US and EU are important factors in explaining how governments, NGOs, and the
broader policy determine and implement preferences regarding CSR in these two important
world regions”.
Fourth, does the timing at which the CSR certiﬁcation standard is set inﬂuence the ﬁrms’
incentives to invest in CSR activities? One reason that this question may deserve attention is
that, although CSR has been reported as a major operational activity of ﬁrms over the past 40
years (Friedman, 1970; Moskowitz, 1972; Parket and Eibert, 1975), it was only in 1998 when
the ﬁrst CSR certiﬁcation standard appeared.8
To address the above questions, we consider a duopoly where ﬁrms plan to follow a “doing
6The Global Ecolabeling Network (GEN) is an example of an international non-proﬁt association of third-
party environmental performance labeling organizations. Ecocert and ScientiﬁcC e r t i ﬁcation Systems are ex-
amples of for-proﬁt private certiﬁers. The former certiﬁes producers whose products fulﬁll some environmental
criteria, and the latter certiﬁes environmental issues in manufacturing (Bottega and De Freitas, 2009). EU’s
Eco-Label is an example of public certifying institution (Baksi and Bose, 2007).
7Hiscox et al. (2008) present some evidence about positive correlation of ISO 8000 certiﬁed ﬁrms and their
market performance. However, according to the authors this evidence is case study-speciﬁc and is not safe for
drawing general conclusions.
8This standard is SA8000 which is based on the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Convention on the Rights of the Child and various International Labour Organization conventions. SA8000 in-
volves the development and auditing of management systems that promote socially acceptable working practices
bringing beneﬁts to the complete supply chain. Moreover, there are a few economic policy ﬁndings reported in
the literature that crucially depend on the timing at which the policy tool is decided by the regulator. See for
instance, Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999, 2003) and Kennedy and Laplante (1999).
2well by doing good” strategy through their engagement in CSR activities.9 Following Besley
and Ghatak (2005; 2007), this strategy can be represented in the ﬁrm’s mission picked by its
owners. In the spirit of Porter and Kramer (2002; 2006), we consider that CSR activities take
the form of voluntary investments in production technologies and business processes along the
value chain, above the requirements of the law, that are in favor of ﬁrms’ stakeholders e.g. their
employees and the environment (Porter and Kramer, 2002; 2006).10 Firms’ products combine
horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation aspects (Häckner, 2000; Garella and Petrakis, 2008).
The vertical diﬀerentiation aspect is related to the ﬁrms’ CSR activities that socially conscious
consumers perceive as a “quality improvement” of the products. Consumers are heterogeneous
with respect to their social consciousness and have diﬀerential valuations for the SR aspects
of the ﬁrms’ products.
The credence aspect of the ﬁrms’ CSR activities generates a moral hazard problem. Once
consumers have been convinced that a ﬁrm has undertaken the missioned CSR eﬀorts, the
ﬁrm has incentives to cheat them and avoid any spending on costly CSR activities.11,12 In
order to avoid the collapse of the SR related goods’ market, there is need for an information
disclosure mechanism to credibly signal the ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts to consumers. The certiﬁcation
process can be undertaken by alternative institutions that diﬀer with respect to their objective.
In this paper, we consider the following three certifying institutions: First, the certiﬁer is a
private company that sets the CSR certiﬁcation standard and charges the respective fee, so as
9According to Benabou and Tirole (2010), “being a good corporate citizen can also make a ﬁrm more
proﬁtable”.
10Firms care about their involvement in socially responsible actions (i.e., a “warm glow”), instead of donating
to “intermediaries” (Benabou and Tirole, 2010). In fact, according to Besley and Ghatak (2005), “donating our
income earned in the market to an organization that pursues a mission that we care about is likely to be an
imperfect substitute for joining and working in it”. Moreover, existing evidence suggests that socially responsible
consumers show strong preference for CSR related products, instead of buying products not connected to CSR
that cost less and donating the rest of the money to a socially responsible cause (Forsyth et al., 1999; Amacher
et al., 2004; Bjorner et al., 2004). This is so because “there is no substitute for asking the ﬁrm to behave well
when the state does not impose constraining regulations” (Benabou and Tirole, 2010).
11According to Besley and Ghatak (2007), “proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms have an incentive to oﬀer to do so and
then renege on this promise”.
12It is evident that ﬁrms consistently try to convince the socially conscious consumers about their CSR
activities, via advertising them and publishing CSR reports (Becchetti et al., 2006; Tsoutsoura, 2004). However,
these communication eﬀorts are not always trustworthy. A widely cited example is for Nike, the athletic products
company (Klein, 1999). The company used fake evidence about the working conditions of child employees in
its factories in Southeastern Asia, in order to construct a SR image in his published CSR reports. Such cases
create considerable doubts to consumers about the ﬁrms’ devotion to CSR values (Porter and Kramer, 2002).
3to maximize its proﬁts. Second, the CSR standard is set by a public certiﬁer that maximizes
total welfare. Finally, the CSR certiﬁcation is provided by a non-proﬁt Non-Governmental
Organization (NGO) whose objective is to maximize consumers’ surplus.13 This is justiﬁed on
the grounds that NGOs behave in a way trying to meet consumers’ “demand for corporations
to behave prosocially on their behalf” (Benabou and Tirole, 2010) because of their “impure
altruism” (Andreoni, 1990). We assume that the CSR certiﬁcation standard is voluntarily
purchased by ﬁrms in all cases and no certiﬁer can exclude from the market any ﬁrm not
complying with it.14 For the public certiﬁer and the NGO, we consider that the cost of
monitoring is ﬁxed and is paid by each ﬁrm that wishes to be certiﬁed.
Our main result is that under all three CSR certifying institutions, ﬁrms, seeking for com-
petitive advantage, undertake CSR eﬀorts complying with the respective standards, in order to
become certiﬁed and credibly disclose information to consumers regarding their products’ SR
attributes. Nevertheless, ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀort levels depend crucially on the certifying institution.
In particular, the equilibrium level of CSR eﬀorts under the private certiﬁer is always the low-
est. Intuitively, the private certiﬁer sets the standard at a level maximizing each ﬁrms’ extra
proﬁts from CSR activities, in order to capture, via the certiﬁcation fee, these extra proﬁts
and thus maximize its own proﬁts. Clearly, there is no concern about consumers’ surplus in
the private certiﬁer’s objective function. In contrast, the NGO and the public certiﬁer set the
standard at a level maximizing consumers’ surplus and total welfare, respectively. Hence, they
both take into account the socially conscious consumers’ willingness to pay for the ﬁrms’ CSR
activities and thus set certiﬁcation standards higher than the one that maximizes ﬁrms’ proﬁts
alone. Moreover, if the monitoring cost is low enough, the equilibrium level of CSR eﬀorts are
higher under the NGO rather than under the public certiﬁe r .F o rah i g he n o u g hm o n i t o r i n g
cost, CSR eﬀorts under the NGO and the public certiﬁer are equal. This occurs because both
certiﬁers set the standard such that the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between purchasing or not the
certiﬁcation standard.
13Alternatively, one can assume that the NGO maximizes a social welfare function weighting consumers’
surplus relatively more than the public certiﬁer does. Heyes and Maxwell (2004) consider the case where
t h ep u b l i cc e r t i ﬁer and the NGO maximize a diﬀerentially weighted social welfare function, with respect to
environmental quality.
14This is in contrast to Bottega and De Freitas (2009), where the regulator sets a compulsory standard and
has the ability to exclude from the market the products that do not fulﬁll these standards.
4As regards the second question, we ﬁnd that under all certifying institutions, output, price
and gross proﬁts of a certiﬁed ﬁrm are higher than the respective ones of a non-certiﬁed ﬁrm.
Intuitively, a certiﬁed ﬁrm’s CSR activities shift its output reaction function outwards and also
increase its product’s price, since consumers are willing to pay more due to its product’s SR
attributes. Yet, a higher CSR eﬀort increases the ﬁrm’s unit cost. It is the ﬁrst eﬀect that
dominates and thus, equilibrium output, gross proﬁts and price of the certiﬁed ﬁrm are higher.
Further, the ﬁrms’ output levels and gross proﬁts are the highest under the private certiﬁer
and the lowest under the NGO, with those under the public certiﬁer lying in between. This
is due to the fact that the higher the CSR eﬀort is, the smaller is the outward shift of the
ﬁrm’s output reaction function. The reverse ranking holds for the equilibrium prices, mainly
because prices reﬂect the increased consumers’ willingness to pay for higher level of products’
SR attributes. Finally, if the monitoring cost is suﬃciently high, output level, price and gross
proﬁts under the public certiﬁer are equal to those under the NGO.
Regarding the third question, we ﬁnd that under all certifying institutions, consumers’
surplus and total welfare are higher when ﬁrms are certiﬁed for their CSR activities rather
than in the no-certiﬁcation case. Hence certiﬁcation of CSR activities is welfare enhancing and
should be encouraged. Clearly, under the NGO consumers’ surplus is higher than under the
public certiﬁer and the latter is higher than under the private certiﬁer. Total welfare is higher
under the public certiﬁer than under the other two certifying institutions. If the monitoring cost
is low enough, total welfare is higher under the private certiﬁer than under the NGO. The latter
occurs because industry proﬁts are maximized under the private certiﬁer and are signiﬁcantly
higher than those of under the NGO who has no concern about proﬁts. The negative eﬀect of
the NGO on proﬁts does not compensate for its positive eﬀect on consumers’ surplus and thus
total welfare is higher under the private certiﬁer. When instead the monitoring cost is high
enough, the NGO is forced to set the standard that satisﬁes the ﬁrms’ participation constraint
and thus, the proﬁte ﬀect is dominated by the consumers’ surplus eﬀect. The above ﬁndings
clearly point out the alignment of market and social incentives for the certiﬁcation of ﬁrms’
CSR activities. Hence, policy measures that are intended to encourage ﬁrms’ CSR activities
and their certiﬁcation should be designed.
Finally, as regards the fourth question, we ﬁnd that when the CSR certiﬁcation standard is
5set after ﬁrms have undertaken their CSR activities (ex-post scenario), then the standard under
all three certifying institutions is equal to the standard set by the private certiﬁer in our basic
ex-ante scenario. Under the private certiﬁer, this happens because its objective coincides with
the maximization of ﬁrms’ extra proﬁts stemming from their CSR activities, independently of
whether the standard is set before or after the ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts. Further, the public certiﬁer
and the NGO set the standard in the second stage equal to the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximizing CSR
eﬀorts undertaken in the ﬁrst stage. Setting a standard higher than that would lead to lower
total welfare and consumers’ surplus, because no ﬁrm could become certiﬁed in this case and
thus credibly signal its product’s SR attributes to consumers.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the use of certiﬁcation in credence goods markets.
Bottega and De Freitas (2009), in a vertical diﬀerentiation setup, consider a monopoly that
certiﬁes the environmental quality of its product through an eco-label. The eco-label is provided
either by a welfare maximizing regulator which sets a mandatory minimum quality standard,
or by a private certiﬁer (either a NGO maximizing average environmental quality or a for-
proﬁt ﬁrm) which sets a voluntary scheme.15 Similarly to us, they ﬁnd that the NGO sets the
highest quality standard. Allowing for interactions between the certiﬁers, they ﬁnd that the
regulator may set a higher standard in the presence of a NGO, as compared to the standard
i nt h ep r e s e n c eo fap r i v a t ec e r t i ﬁer. In a monopolistic context too, Alexander and Harding
(2003) ﬁnd that a social planner will set a standard higher than that set by a proﬁt-maximizing
certiﬁer. Whether the standard in the latter case is lower or higher than that chosen by a non-
for-proﬁtc e r t i ﬁer depends on the relative values of the highest consumer valuation for ethical
behavior and the costs of production. We depart from these papers in four dimensions. First,
we assume a duopolistic market so as to capture the strategic eﬀects of ﬁrms’ interactions
under the alternative certifying institutions. Second, besides ﬁrms’ CSR activities, which
are captured by the vertical diﬀerentiation aspect, we also consider that ﬁrms’ products are
15There is a line of research regarding the relative eﬀectiveness of mandatory certiﬁcation schemes. Heyes
and Maxwell (2004) compare environmental damage, producer surplus and welfare under a World Environ-
mental Organization-run mandatory and an NGO-run voluntary label scheme. Baksi and Bose (2007) consider
that when brown ﬁrms cheat and pretend to be green, the government either makes the third party labelling
mandatory for the brown or for the green ﬁrms, or requires the brown and/or green ﬁrms to self-label their
product. The optimal labelling policy depends on the relative magnitude of the costs of production, labelling,
and monitoring.
6horizontally diﬀerentiated, so as to account for the intensity of market competition between
ﬁrms. Third, ﬁrms are voluntarily certiﬁed and the public certiﬁer cannot exclude from the
market any ﬁrm not complying with the standard. Fourth, we also study the case where CSR
certiﬁcation standard is set after ﬁrms have undertaken their CSR activities.
In a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric ﬁrms, with respect to their marginal costs of qual-
ity provision, Bottega et al. (2009) study the impact of diﬀerent objectives of a certiﬁer on
the ﬁrms’ label adoption choices. They ﬁnd that ﬁr m sa l w a y so p tf o rd i ﬀerentiation strategies
which induces an asymmetric equilibrium where only one ﬁrm (not necessarily the most eﬃ-
cient) adopts the label. Bonroy and Constantatos (2008) assume that consumers have diﬀerent
beliefs and form subjective probabilities regarding which ﬁrm produces the high quality. They
ﬁnd that the high quality producer may be at disadvantage because of its higher cost and
the informational asymmetry. They further argue that the high quality credence goods can
obtain the eﬃcient market share via mandatory labelling. In the present paper, only symmet-
ric equilibria emerge. This happens because when one ﬁrm certiﬁes a certain level of socially
responsible attributes attached to its products, the rival ﬁrm’s best response is to follow suit.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on “strategic CSR”, in the terminology of Baron
(2001) and in the spirit of a “doing well by doing good” strategy (Benabou and Tirole, 2010).
The present paper stresses how ﬁrms, seeking for competitive advantage, engage strategically
in CSR activities that comply with the standard set by alternative certifying institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the analysis
of the benchmark case with no certiﬁcation. In Section 3, the case of the for-proﬁtp r i v a t e
certiﬁer is analyzed. In Section 4, we examine the case of the welfare maximizing public
certiﬁer. In Section 5, the case of the consumers’ surplus maximizing Non Governmental
Organization is presented. Section 6 compares the market and societal outcomes of the three
alternative certifying institutions. In Section 7, we consider a number of extensions of our
basic model. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
72 The Model
We consider a market that consists of two ﬁrms, denoted by i,j =1 ,2,i6= j,w i t he a c hﬁrm
producing one brand of a diﬀerentiated good. The objective of each ﬁrm is proﬁt maximization.
To attain this objective, a ﬁrm has the option to follow a “doing well by doing good” strategy,
via its engagement in CSR activities. We consider that the latter take the form of voluntary
investments in production technologies and business processes along the value chain, beyond
the requirements of the law, that are in favor of ﬁrms’ stakeholders, e.g. their employees and
the environment (Porter and Kramer, 2002, 2006).
On the demand side there is a unit mass of consumers who have identical preferences
regarding the physical characteristics of the two goods. Yet, they are heterogeneous regarding
their valuation of the CSR activities undertaken by the ﬁrms. In particular, following Häckner
(2000), the utility function of the θ-type consumer is given by:
U =( a + θsi)xi(θ)+( a + θsj)xj(θ) − [x2
i(θ)+x2
j(θ)+2 γxi(θ)xj(θ)]/2+m(θ) (1)
where xi(θ), i =1 ,2, represents the quantity of ﬁrm i’s good bought by the θ-type consumer
and m(θ) is the respective quantity of the “composite good”. The parameter γ ∈ (0,1] is the
degree of product substitutability, with γ → 0 corresponding to the case of almost independent
goods and γ =1to the case of homogeneous goods. Thus γ can also be interpreted as a
measure of the intensity of competition between ﬁrms, with a higher γ corresponding to ﬁercer
competition.
In this context, we argue that the SR attributes attached to products, via the ﬁrms’ CSR
activities, are unobservable by consumers, even after consumption. Thus, a product’s SR
attributes are classiﬁed as a credence good, with si ≥ 0 representing the CSR eﬀort undertaken
by ﬁrm i, which, in turn, increases the θ-type consumer’s valuation for its good by θsi.I n
other words, θ represents the increase of the θ-type consumer’s willingness to pay for the ﬁrm
i’s good per unit of its CSR eﬀort. The more socially conscious a consumer is, the higher is his
θ. A consumer who does not value the CSR activities at all is then of type θ =0 . We assume
that θ is uniformly distributed in [0,1], i.e., its density function is f(θ)=1for all θ ∈ [0,1].
8Then ¯ θ =1 /2 represents the average type of consumer in the population.
Maximization of (1) with respect to {xi(θ), xj(θ)} gives the (inverse) demand functions for
the θ-type consumer:
pi = a + θsi − xi(θ) − γxj(θ),i , j =1 ,2,i6= j (2)
By inverting (2) we obtain the θ-type consumer’s demand functions:
xi(θ)=
a(1 − γ)+θ(si − γsj) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (3)
where pi and pj are the ﬁrms’ prices, while the price of the composite good has been normalized
to unity.






2(si − γsj) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (4)




si − qi − γqj,i =1 ,2,i6= j (5)
Observe that ﬁrm i’s inverse demand is positively related to the average consumer’s type
¯ θ =1 /2 and the ﬁrm i’s CSR eﬀort level si.T h i s r e ﬂects the main idea of our model, that
is, socially conscious consumers’ valuation for a product increases with the ﬁrm’s CSR eﬀort
level. This, in turn, increases the demand for this ﬁrm’s product.
We assume that ﬁrms are endowed with identical constant returns to scale production
technologies. Firm i’s total cost function is given by Ci(qi,s i)=c(1 + s2
i)qi with 0 <c<a .
This implies that, for a given CSR eﬀort level si,t h eﬁrm i’s marginal (and unitary) cost is
constant and equal to c(1 + s2
i).Y e t , a h i g h e r C S R e ﬀort level increases, at an increasing
rate, ﬁrm i’s unit costs. This is justiﬁed on the grounds that an individual ﬁrm’s level of
CSR activities, such as improving working conditions for employees, buying more expensive
inputs from local suppliers, ﬁnancing recycling and other SR campaigns or introducing “green”
9technologies, has an increasingly negative impact on the ﬁrm’s unit production costs.
In the sequel we will make the following assumption that guarantees interior solutions in
all cases.
Assumption 1 c(a − c) ≥ 1
3
Assumption 1 requires that the marginal production cost c whenever ﬁrm i undertakes
zero CSR eﬀort is neither too low nor too high. Under this assumption, even the θ =0
consumer-type makes positive purchases of both goods under all circumstances.16
Firm i’s proﬁts can then be expressed as:
Πi =( a +
1
2
si − qi − γqj)qi − c(1 + s2
i)qi (6)
Therefore, ﬁrm i’s CSR activities si lead to higher consumers’ willingness to pay for its
product and thus to higher demand. At the same time, CSR activities increase ﬁrm i’s unit
and total production costs.
The credence aspect of the ﬁrms’ CSR activities generates a moral hazard problem. In
particular, once consumers are convinced that ﬁrm i has undertaken a CSR eﬀort si,t h e i r
willingness to pay for ﬁrm i’s good increases. Yet, in the absence of any credible information
disclosure mechanism, ﬁrm i has incentives to cheat consumers and avoid any spending on
costly CSR activities. In such a situation, consumers anticipate ﬁrm i’s incentives to cheat
them and rationally believe that there will be zero CSR activities (si =0 ). The ﬁrm, in turn,
spends zero on CSR in equilibrium. Hence, it is precisely this imperfect information that will
cause the breakdown of the SR related goods’ market.
In order to avoid the collapse of the SR related goods’ market, there is need for an infor-
mation disclosure mechanism to credibly signal the ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts to consumers. In this
context, certiﬁcation by a third party, verifying “the fulﬁllments of a ﬁrm to certain crite-
ria or standards” (Bottega and De Freitas, 2009), serves as a credible information disclosure
mechanism of ﬁrms’ CSR activities that are unobservable by consumers.
16Relaxing Assumption 1 would create unnecessary analytical complications without qualitatively altering
our main results.
10The certiﬁcation process can be undertaken by alternative institutions that diﬀer with
respect to their objective. We consider the following three certifying institutions. First, the
certiﬁer is a private company that sets a CSR certiﬁcation standard and also charges a fee, so
as to maximize its proﬁts. Second, the CSR standard is set by a public certiﬁer that maximizes
total welfare. Third, the certiﬁer is a non-for-proﬁt Non Governmental Organization (NGO)
setting a CSR certiﬁcation standard, so as to maximize consumers’ surplus. We assume that
the CSR certiﬁcation standard is voluntarily purchased by ﬁrms in all cases and no certiﬁer
can exclude from the market any ﬁrm not complying with it. For the public certiﬁer and the
NGO, we consider that the cost of monitoring is ﬁxed and is paid by each ﬁrm that wishes to
be certiﬁed.
Following Bottega and De Freitas (2009), we make two additional assumptions: First, the
certiﬁcation technology is the same for all the certifying institutions. Second, monitoring is
perfect, i.e., the certiﬁer can trace a ﬁrm revealing untruthful information to consumers with
probability one. Hence, consumers that observe the CSR certiﬁcation of a product are aware
that the certiﬁed ﬁrm is socially responsible and complies with the standard.
2.1 The Sequence of Moves
We consider a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the certiﬁer sets the CSR certiﬁcation
standard. In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously and independently, either undertake the
CSR eﬀorts complying with the standard and purchase the certiﬁcate, or do not engage in
CSR activities at all.17 In the last stage, ﬁrms compete in the market by setting quantities,
while consumers make their purchases according to their type towards CSR and the ﬁrms’ CSR
certiﬁcates obtained in the previous stage.18,19 We solve the game by employing the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) solution concept.
17In Section 7, we also examine the case where the CSR certiﬁcation standard is set ex-post, i.e., ﬁrms decide
over their CSR eﬀorts ﬁrst and then the certiﬁer decides whether or not to provide the certiﬁcation.
18The decisions over CSR eﬀorts and output levels are taken in subsequent stages because, although CSR
eﬀorts are unobservable, the CSR eﬀorts of a certiﬁed in the second stage ﬁrm are guaranteed by the certiﬁer
before this ﬁrm sets its quantity.
19I ns e c t i o n7 ,w ea l s oe x a m i n et h ec a s ew h e r eﬁrms compete in prices.
112.2 The Benchmark case: No certiﬁcation
We begin our analysis by brieﬂy presenting the benchmark case where there is no certiﬁcation
mechanism to disclose credible information to consumers regarding the ﬁrms’ CSR activities.
As mentioned above, in this case, consumers rationally believe that ﬁrms have undertaken zero
CSR activities. Anticipating this, ﬁr m sd on o ts p e n do nC S R( si =0 , i =1 ,2). This turns
out to be a standard Cournot game with horizontally diﬀerentiated goods, where each ﬁrm
chooses output to maximize proﬁts:
Πi =( a − qi − γqj)qi − cqi (7)
From the ﬁrst order condition, the reaction function of ﬁrm i is:
qi = RN
i (qj)=
a − γqj − c
2
(8)




; pN = c +
a − c
2+γ
; πN =( qN)2 (9)
Finally, since all consumers have identical preferences over the physical characteristics of
the two goods and there is a unit mass of them in the population, it turns out that each
consumer buys a quantity xN = qN from each good; moreover, that consumers’ surplus and
total welfare are given by CSN =( 1+γ)(qN)2 and TWN =( 3+γ)(qN)2, respectively.
3 Private Certiﬁer
We ﬁrst consider the case in which ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts are certiﬁed by a private proﬁt-maximizing
certiﬁer. Let sP
i be the CSR standard that the private certiﬁer sets for ﬁrm i,i =1 ,2. Assume
for the moment that each ﬁrm undertakes the CSR eﬀorts complying with its respective stan-
dard and purchases the certiﬁcate after paying the certiﬁcation fee Fi. Later on we will show
that this is so in equilibrium.
In the last stage of the game, ﬁrms anticipate that their CSR eﬀorts have been credibly
disclosed to consumers, via certiﬁcation. Then ﬁrm i, taking as given the output of the rival
12ﬁrm qj,c h o o s e sqi to maximize its proﬁts, given by (6).














i (qj) with the benchmark no-certiﬁcation reaction function RN
i (qj),t h ef o l -
lowing observations are in order: First, RP
i (qj) has an additional term capturing the two eﬀects
of CSR eﬀorts sP
i on ﬁrm i’s (best-response) output level. On the one hand, a unitary increase
in CSR eﬀorts increases the demand for ﬁrm i’s good by ¯ θ =1 /2, i.e., by the average con-
sumer’s type willingness to pay. Thus, CSR eﬀorts tend to increase ﬁrm i’s output and proﬁts.
On the other hand, CSR eﬀorts increase ﬁrm i’s unit costs, tending to decrease its output








i ), ﬁrm i’s output level has an inverted U-shaped
relation with its CSR eﬀorts, with the maximum attained at sP
i =1 /4c. The intuition goes
as follows. For a relatively low level of CSR eﬀorts (sP
i < 1/4c), a small increase in sP
i leads
to an increase in output level because the positive demand eﬀect dominates the negative unit
cost eﬀect. This reasoning is reversed for relatively higher levels of CSR eﬀorts (sP
i > 1/4c),
in which case a further increase in CSR eﬀorts induces a signiﬁcant increase in unit costs and
a reduction in output level. In fact, when sP
i > 1/2c, the ﬁrm i’s reaction function shifts in,
as compared with the respective one under no certiﬁcation. Third, ﬁrm i’s reaction function
RP
i (qj) depends on the rival ﬁrm’s CSR eﬀort sj, but only through qj.



































ig represents ﬁrm i’s proﬁts from engaging in CSR before the payment of the certiﬁ-
cation fee Fi.
In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to under-
13take the CSR eﬀorts complying with the standard set by the private certiﬁer in the ﬁrst stage
and purchase the respective certiﬁcate. Firm i engages in CSR activities only if its proﬁts, net





j ) − Fi ≥ πN.
Following Bottega and De Freitas (2009) along with Hardling and Alexander (2003), we
assume that the private certiﬁer, while setting the CSR certiﬁcation standard and the respective
fee, has all the bargaining power; hence, it is able to extract, via the certiﬁcation fee, all the
extra proﬁts from each ﬁrm’s CSR activities, i.e., Fi = ΠP
ig(sP
i ,s P
j ) − πN.20 Thus, in the
ﬁrst stage, the certiﬁer sets the CSR standards (sP
i ,s P
j ) at the level that maximizes industry






j ) − 2πN. The latter is equivalent to






































2(4−γ2) . Solving the system of equations, we obtain the CSR
certiﬁcation standard that the private certiﬁer will set for both ﬁrms in equilibrium:22
sP
i = sP









=0 ,i=1 ,2. This implies that the private certiﬁer sets the















It is then easy to see that sP is the level of CSR eﬀorts that each ﬁrm will undertake in
equilibrium. Assume that a ﬁrm undertakes a CSR eﬀort level lower than sP. Then this ﬁrm
simply does not comply with the standard and cannot be certiﬁed. Clearly, since the rival
20This speciﬁcation allows us to consider that the private certiﬁer can spend part of Fi on monitoring as well
as on persuasive advertising, in order to increase consumers’ awareness for CSR related products and hence,
promote the certiﬁcate (Bottega and De Freitas, 2009).
21It can be checked that the second order conditions are satisﬁed in the equilibrium certiﬁcation standards.
22Note that under Assumption 1, an asymmetric equilibrium where the private certiﬁer sets a certiﬁcation
standard for only one ﬁrm, leaving non-certiﬁed its rival, is strictly dominated by the symmetric certiﬁcation
equilibrium.
14ﬁrm is certiﬁed, the ﬁrm concedes competitive advantage to its rival and thus, its proﬁts will
be lower than πN. On the other hand, no ﬁrm has incentives to undertake a CSR eﬀort level
higher than sP because this higher eﬀort is costly and cannot be certiﬁed; hence, it would again
lead to proﬁts lower than πN (after the payment of the certiﬁcation fee FP). As expected,
the equilibrium CSR eﬀort level decreases as the CSR (and output) “production technology”
b e c o m e sl e s se ﬃcient, as captured by a higher c.
Substituting sP into (11), (5) and (6), we obtain ﬁrm i’s equilibrium output, price, gross
and net proﬁts, as well as the fee that the private certiﬁer charges, respectively:
qP =
1+1 6 c(a − c)
16c(2 + γ)
; pP = c +









g − πN =
1 + 32(a − c)c
256c2(2 + γ)2 (14)
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the private certiﬁer sets the CSR certiﬁcation standard at a
level sP = 1
4c and charges a fee that captures all ﬁrms’ extra proﬁts from certiﬁcation. Each
ﬁrm undertakes CSR eﬀorts sP and complies with the standard in equilibrium.
The intuition goes as follows. By being certiﬁed, a ﬁrm credibly discloses information to
consumers for its product’s SR attributes that are unobservable. Hence, consumers increase
their willingness to pay for this ﬁrm’s product and the ﬁrm obtains a competitive advantage in
the market, increasing its proﬁts, provided that the rival ﬁrm is not certiﬁed. Moreover, when
ﬁrm i is certiﬁed, ﬁrm j’s decision either to totally abstain from CSR activities or to undertake
some CSR activities but without being certiﬁed, signals to consumers that ﬁrm j’s product
does not have any SR attributes, thus conceding competitive advantage to its rival. Now,
the cost savings on CSR eﬀort do not compensate for the revenue losses due to the decreased
consumers’ valuation for the ﬁrm j’s product. Thus, such a ﬁrm j’s decision is unproﬁtable.
Hence, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms undertake CSR eﬀorts complying with the standard and
purchase the CSR certiﬁcate.
The above reasoning suggests that an asymmetric conﬁguration in which ﬁrm i is being
certiﬁed while ﬁrm j is not, will never arise in equilibrium. It can easily be veriﬁed that in
15this case, ﬁrm j’s proﬁts will be lower than the respective ones when both ﬁrms are certiﬁed.
Moreover, the non-certiﬁed ﬁrm ends up with output and proﬁts lower than the respective ones
in the no certiﬁcation benchmark. Note also that the case in which none ﬁrm is being certiﬁed
is not an equilibrium conﬁguration. Firm i’s optimal response to the non-certiﬁed ﬁrm j is to
be certiﬁed.
It can be checked that equilibrium output, price, gross and net ﬁrms’ proﬁts decrease as
competition becomes ﬁercer, i.e., when products become closer substitutes (higher γ). More-
over, these equilibrium values decrease as the CSR (and output) “production technology”
becomes less eﬃcient (higher c). As gross and net proﬁts decrease with γ and c, it turns out
that the fee FP charged by the certiﬁer follows the same pattern.
We next compare the equilibrium outcomes in case of a private certiﬁer with the respective
ones under no certiﬁcation. The following Corollary summarizes:
Corollary 1 Equilibrium ﬁrms’ output level, gross proﬁts and price are higher than the re-
spective ones in the benchmark case with no certiﬁcation. Equilibrium ﬁrms’ net proﬁts
are equal to those under no certiﬁcation.
Intuitively, since sP = 1
4c, CSR activities shift ﬁrm i’s output reaction function outwards,
implying a more aggressive behavior during the quantity setting stage which results in increased
equilibrium output and gross proﬁts, i.e. qP >q N and ΠP
g >π N. Moreover, since consumers’
willingness to pay for CSR related products increases as ﬁrms undertake higher CSR eﬀorts, it
is clear that pP >p N. Note also that each ﬁrm ends up with net proﬁts equal to the respective
ones under no certiﬁcation, i.e., ΠP
n = πN. This happens because the private certiﬁer charges
a fee extracting all the extra proﬁts from each ﬁrm’s CSR activities.
3.1 Welfare Analysis
We now investigate the welfare eﬀects of ﬁrms’ CSR activities when these are certiﬁed by a
private certiﬁer. Total welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumers’ surplus, ﬁrms’ net proﬁts
and the certiﬁer’s fees. This is equivalent to the sum of consumers’ surplus and ﬁrms’ gross
proﬁts:
16SWP = CSP +2 ΠP
n +2 FP = CSP +2 ΠP
g (15)





Exploiting symmetry, using (2) and after some manipulations, (16) reduces to:
CSP(θ)=( 1+γ)[xP(θ)]2 (17)
Further, since pP = a + 1
2sP − (1 + γ)qP,w eh a v e : 23
xP(θ)=







Consumers’ surplus is then given by CSP =( 1+γ)
R 1
0 [xP(θ)]2dθ (since f(θ)=1for all θ).




















(1 + γ)2 dθ
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Comparing CSP with the respective one under no-certiﬁcation, we observe that the former
is always higher. This is so because CSP > (1+γ)(qP)2 > (1+γ)(qN)2 = CSN. The intuitive
explanation behind this result is similar to the one regarding the higher output level under
a private certiﬁer, relative to the output level under no-certiﬁcation. It is worth stressing
23It can be checked that under Assumption 1, even the θ =0consumer-type buys positive amounts of both
goods in equilibrium, i.e., x
P(0) > 0.
17here that consumers’ heterogeneity in terms of their willingness to pay for the SR attributes
of goods contributes positively to the consumers’ surplus. In fact, the second term in (20) is
proportional to
¡
sP¢2 , with coeﬃcient of proportionality the variance of consumers’ preferences
in the population, var(θ)= 1
12. Further, since the certiﬁer’s proﬁts are equal to the ﬁrms’ extra
proﬁts form their CSR activities, total welfare turns out to be higher under certiﬁcation too.
Finally, as output and proﬁts decrease with c and γ, it is easy to see that CSP and TWP follow
the same pattern too.
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 2 Consumers’ surplus and total welfare are always higher under a private cer-
tiﬁer rather than under no-certiﬁcation. Moreover, they both increase when the production
technology becomes more eﬃcient (lower c), and decrease when the goods are less diﬀerentiated
and the market competition becomes ﬁercer (higher γ).
An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that there is alignment among market and
social incentives for certifying ﬁrms’ CSR activities. Firms, by engaging in CSR activities,
obtain higher proﬁts due to consumers’ increased willingness to pay for their products. More-
over, consumers’ surplus increases because ﬁrms satisfy their demand for products with SR
attributes.
4P u b l i c C e r t i ﬁer
We next consider the case in which a public certiﬁer sets an industry-wide CSR certiﬁcation
standard sR, so as to maximize total welfare, and provides the respective certiﬁcate to any ﬁrm
complying with the standard.24 Similarly to the previous case, the public certiﬁer monitors
and certiﬁes ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts. We assume that the public certiﬁer can trace a ﬁrm revealing
untruthful information with probability one. The cost of monitoring M is ﬁxed and is paid by
each ﬁrm that wishes to be certiﬁed.
Suppose that both ﬁrms have being certiﬁed, i.e., sR
i = sR
j = sR. In the last stage of the
game, certiﬁed ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts have been credibly disclosed to consumers via certiﬁcation.
24T h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h ep u b l i cc e r t i ﬁer has the option to set a diﬀerent standard for each ﬁrm does not alter
our results.
18Firm i,t a k i n gqj as given, chooses qi to maximize its proﬁts. The ﬁrst order condition leads
to ﬁrm i’s reaction function, which is given by (10), in which sR
i = sR. Solving the system
of ﬁrst order conditions and exploiting symmetry, we obtain ﬁrm i’s output and gross proﬁts,
respectively:
qR(sR)=




g (sR)=[ qR(sR)]2 (21)
where ΠR
g represents ﬁrm i’s gross proﬁts from engaging in CSR, net of the payment of the
monitoring cost.
In the second stage, ﬁrms simultaneously and non-cooperatively decide whether to un-
dertake the CSR eﬀorts complying with the standard set by the public certiﬁer in the ﬁrst
stage and purchase the respective certiﬁcate. Firm i engages in CSR only if its proﬁts,
net from the monitoring cost, are equal or higher than those under no certiﬁcation, i.e.,
only if ΠR
n = ΠR
g (sR) − M ≥ πN.E q u i v a l e n t l y , ﬁrm i engages in CSR activities only if
sR ≤ ¯ s(M),where ¯ s represents the maximum certiﬁcation standard that the ﬁrm has incen-






(a − c)2 + M(2 + γ)2 − (a − c)
´
4c
, 0 ≤ M ≤ Mmax =
1+3 2 c(a − c)
256c2(2 + γ)2
(22)
Note that when the monitoring cost is null, M =0 ,t h e n¯ s(0) = smax =1 /2c. In the latter
case, ﬁrm i’s reaction function under certiﬁcation coincides with that under no certiﬁcation.
The two opposing eﬀects of CSR eﬀorts on ﬁrm i’s output (the positive demand increase eﬀect
and the negative unit cost eﬀect) cancel out and hence, there is no shift in ﬁrm i’s reaction
function. Further, ∂¯ s
∂M < 0, implying that the maximum standard that the public certiﬁer can
set, such that ﬁrms have incentives to engage in CSR activities, decreases with the monitoring
cost. Finally, observe that the maximum permissible monitoring cost is equal to the optimal
fee that the private certiﬁer sets (Mmax = FP). In the latter case, ¯ s(Mmax)=sP =1 /4c.
In the ﬁrst stage, the public certiﬁer sets the CSR standard so as to maximize total welfare:
19TWR = CSR(sR)+2 ΠR
g (sR)+2 M = CSR(sR)+2 ΠR
g (sR) (23)























24c(1+γ) > 0; hence, sR
o >s P = 1





12c(1+γ) < 0 (under Assumption 1); hence, sR
o < 1
2c. An immediate consequence of
these, coupled with our discussion above, is that there exists a c MR such that for all M<c MR,
sR
o < ¯ s(M), and vice versa. Hence, if the monitoring cost is relatively low, M<c MR,t h e
public certiﬁer sets the certiﬁcation standard sR
o that maximizes total welfare. Substituting
sR
o into (21), (5) and (6), we obtain ﬁrm i’s equilibrium output, price, gross and net proﬁts,
respectively. In contrast, if the monitoring cost is relatively high, M>c MR, the public certiﬁer
sets the CSR standard ¯ s(M) that leaves ﬁrms with no extra proﬁts from CSR certiﬁcation.
Substituting ¯ s(M) in the above expressions, we obtain the respective equilibrium outcome.
Note also that both sR
o and ¯ s(M) decrease as the CSR (and output) “production technology”
becomes less eﬃcient. The above hold for reasons similar to those stated in the case of the
private certiﬁer.
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, if the monitoring cost is relatively low (high), i.e., M<c MR
(M>c MR) ,t h ep u b l i cc e r t i ﬁer sets the certiﬁcation standard sR = sR
o (sR =¯ s(M)). Each
ﬁrm undertakes CSR eﬀorts sR and complies with the standard in equilibrium.
The intuitive arguments are along the lines of those under the private certiﬁcation case. A
number of additional observations are in order. First, an asymmetric conﬁguration in which
25Due to space limitations, the analytical formulas are available from the authors upon request.
20ﬁrm i is being certiﬁed while ﬁrm j does not, will never arise in equilibrium. Second, equilibrium
ﬁrm ´ ı’s output level, gross proﬁts and price are always higher than the respective ones under
no certiﬁcation. Regarding equilibrium ﬁrm ´ ı’s net proﬁts, if M<c MR and sR = sR
o ,t h e ya r e
higher than under no certiﬁcation. For higher monitoring costs, they are equal to those under
no certiﬁcation because the public certiﬁer sets sR =¯ s(M). As expected, consumers’ surplus
and total welfare are always higher under a public certiﬁer rather than under no-certiﬁcation.
Finally, equilibrium output, price, gross and net ﬁrms’ proﬁts as well as consumer surplus and
total welfare follow the same pattern in c and γ, as in the private certiﬁer case. The above
hold for reasons similar to those stated in the private certiﬁer case.
5C e r t i ﬁcation by a Non Governmental Organization
In this section we consider the case in which the industry-wide CSR certiﬁcation standard
is provided by a Non Governmental Organization (NGO) who is interested in enhancing the
welfare of consumers. We thus postulate that the objective function of the NGO is to maximize
consumers’ surplus.
Similarly to the public certiﬁer’s case, here too, the cost of monitoring M is ﬁxed and is
paid by any ﬁr mw i s h i n gt ob ec e r t i ﬁed. Moreover, the probability of tracing a ﬁrm revealing
untruthful information is one. Here too, we assume that both ﬁrms comply with the CSR
standard sG set by the NGO and we then show that this is so in equilibrium.
The last stage of the game is as in Section 4 and output levels and gross proﬁts are given by
(21), where sR has been replaced by sG. In the second stage, ﬁrm i engages in CSR only if its
proﬁts, net from the monitoring cost, are equal or higher than its proﬁts under no-certiﬁcation,
i.e., only if ΠG
n = ΠG
g (sG) − M ≥ πN.H e n c e ,ﬁrm i engages in CSR only if sG ≤ s(M) (see
(22).










21The ﬁrst-order condition of (25) determines the optimal CSR certiﬁcation standard sG
o :26
∂CSG















(under Assumption 1). Hence, 1
4c <s G
o < 1
2c. An immediate consequence is that there exists a
c MG such that for all M<c MG,s G
o < ¯ s(M), and vice versa. Therefore, if the monitoring cost
is relatively low, M<c MG, the NGO sets the certiﬁcation standard at its optimal level sG
o .I n
contrast, if it is relatively high, M>c MG, the NGO sets the standard ¯ s(M) that satisﬁes the
ﬁrms participation constraint. Substituting sG
o and ¯ s(M) into (21), (5) and (6), we obtain ﬁrm
i’s equilibrium output, price, gross and net proﬁts, for the case where the NGO sets the CSR
certiﬁcation standard at sR
o and at ¯ s(M) respectively. Note also that when the monitoring cost
takes the maximum permissible value, (Mmax = FP), ﬁrm i’s CSR eﬀorts, output level and
gross proﬁts under the NGO are equal to the respective ones under the public and the private
certiﬁer. Finally, it is easy to see that c MG < c MR.
The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, if the monitoring cost is relatively low (high), i.e., M<c MG
(M>c MG), the NGO sets the certiﬁcation standard sG = sG
o (sG =¯ s). Each ﬁrm undertakes
CSR eﬀorts sG and complies with the standard in equilibrium.
The intuitive arguments are along the lines of the analysis for the public certiﬁer. Note also
that under the NGO too, an asymmetric conﬁguration where only one ﬁrm is being certiﬁed,
will never arise in equilibrium. Our observations for the case of the public certiﬁer, regarding
the comparison of the equilibrium results under the NGO with those under no-certiﬁcation as
well as the eﬀects of c and γ,h o l di nt h ep r e s e n tc a s et o o .
6C o m p a r i s o n
We next turn to the comparison of the equilibrium outcomes under the three alternative
certifying institutions, in order to evaluate their relative market and societal eﬀects.
26Due to space limitations, the analytical formulas are available from the authors upon request.
22The following Proposition summarizes our ﬁndings regarding the certiﬁcation standards
under the three alternative institutions:
Proposition 5 (i) If the monitoring cost is low enough, i.e., M<c MG, the public certiﬁer
and the NGO set the certiﬁcation standard at their respective optimal levels, sR
o and sG
o .T h e
certiﬁcation standard is the highest under the NGO, it is the lowest under the private certiﬁer,
while it lies in between under the public certiﬁer (sG
o >s R
o >s P).
(ii) For intermediate values of the monitoring cost, i.e., M ∈ [c MG, c MR], the public certiﬁer
sets the certiﬁcation standard at its optimal level sR
o while the NGO sets the standard at the
level satisfying the ﬁrms’ participation constraint ¯ s(M).A g a i n t h e c e r t i ﬁcation standard is
the highest under the NGO, it is the lowest under the private certiﬁer, while it lies in between
under the public certiﬁer (sG =¯ s(M) >s R
o >s P).
(iii) If the monitoring cost is high enough, i.e., M ∈ (c MR,M max), both the public certi-
ﬁer and the NGO set the certiﬁcation standard at the level satisfying the ﬁrms’ participation
constraint ¯ s(M). The latter is higher than the certiﬁcation standard under the private certiﬁer
(sG = sR =¯ s(M) >s P).
(iv) If the monitoring cost takes its maximum permissible value (Mmax = FP), the certiﬁ-
cation standard is equal across all three certifying institutions (sG = sR = sP =¯ s(Mmax)).
• These results are illustrated in Figure 1.
The intuition behind these results goes as follows. The private certiﬁer sets the standard
at a level maximizing each ﬁrm’s extra proﬁts from CSR activities, in order to capture, via the
certiﬁcation fee, these extra proﬁts and thus maximize its own proﬁts. There is, thus, no con-
sideration for consumers’ surplus in the private certiﬁer’s objective function. On the contrary,
the NGO and the public certiﬁer set the standard at a level maximizing consumers’ surplus
and total welfare, respectively. Hence the NGO and the public certiﬁer incorporate in their
objective function the socially conscious consumers’ valuation of the ﬁrms’ CSR activities and
their respective optimal CSR standards are higher than the certiﬁcation standard maximizing
ﬁrms’ proﬁts alone. Moreover, since the NGO certiﬁer cares only about consumers’ surplus,
and not about ﬁrms’ proﬁts, its certiﬁcation standard is, in general, higher than the standard
set by the public certiﬁer. In fact, if the monitoring cost is suﬃciently low (M<c MR), sG
o >s R
o
23Figure 1: Equilibrium CSR certiﬁcation standards under the three certifying institutions.
(Proposition 5(i) & (ii)). However, if the monitoring cost is high enough (c MR <M<M max),
both the NGO and the public certiﬁer are restricted by the ﬁrms’ participation constraints and
set the standard at the level that leaves ﬁrms with no extra proﬁts from their CSR activities
(Proposition 5(iii)). Finally, in the polar case where the monitoring cost takes its maximum
permissible value (Mmax = FP), all three certiﬁers set the same CSR standard that satisﬁes
the ﬁrms’ participation constraints.
Let us now compare the equilibrium market outcomes under the three alternative certifying
institutions. The following Proposition summarizes:
Proposition 6 (i) If the monitoring cost is suﬃciently low, i.e., M<c MR, ﬁrm i’s output
level and gross proﬁts (price) are the highest (lowest) under the private certiﬁer, they are the
lowest (highest) under the NGO, while they lie in between under the public certiﬁer (qP >
qR >q G, ΠP
g > ΠR
g > ΠG
g and pP <p R <p G).
(ii) If the monitoring cost is suﬃciently high, i.e., M ∈ (c MR,M max), ﬁrm i’s output level,
price and gross proﬁts under the public certiﬁer and the NGO are equal. Firm i’s output level
and gross proﬁts (price) are higher (lower) under the private certiﬁer rather than under the
public certiﬁer and the NGO (qP >q R = qG, ΠP
g > ΠR
g = ΠG
g and pP <p R = pG).
24(iii) If the monitoring cost takes its maximum permissible value (Mmax = FP), ﬁrm i’s
output level, price and gross proﬁts are equal across all three certifying institutions (qP =
qR = qG, ΠP
g = ΠR
g = ΠG
g and pP = pR = pG).
Regarding output level and gross proﬁts, the intuition goes as follows. For a suﬃciently
low monitoring cost (M<c MR), the fact that the certiﬁcation standard is the highest under
the NGO has two negative eﬀects on ﬁrm i’s output level and gross proﬁts. As compared to
the CSR standard under the private certiﬁer, ﬁrstly, it induces a relatively smaller outward
shift of ﬁrm i’s output reaction function (recall that sR
o and sG
o lie in the area where
∂q
∂s < 0);
and secondly, it leads to a relatively larger unit cost increase. In addition, under the NGO,
t h eo u t w a r ds h i f to fﬁrm i’s output reaction function is smaller and the unit cost increase is
larger, as compared to the public certiﬁer case. Hence, ﬁrm i’s output level and gross proﬁts
are, in general, higher under the private certiﬁer than under the public certiﬁer and the latter
are higher than those under the NGO.
Regarding equilibrium prices, the intuition is straightforward. Firm i’s price increases with
its CSR eﬀort level si, while it decreases with aggregate output level. For M<c MR, the output
eﬀect under the private certiﬁer is the most severe, while it is the least severe under the NGO.
In contrast, the ﬁrm’s CSR eﬀort is the highest under the NGO, while it is the lowest under the
private certiﬁer. It turns out that the CSR eﬀort eﬀect always dominates the output eﬀect and
hence, the equilibrium price under the NGO is higher than the price under the public certiﬁer,
which, in turn, is higher than the price under the private certiﬁer. Finally, Proposition 6 (ii &
iii) derive directly from Proposition 5 (iii & iv), respectively.
N e x t ,w ec o m p a r et h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects of the three alternative certifying institutions. Re-
garding consumers’ surplus, the following Proposition summarizes our ﬁndings:
Proposition 7 (i) If the monitoring cost is suﬃciently low, i.e., M<c MR, consumers’ surplus
is the highest under the NGO, it is the lowest under the private certiﬁer, while it lies in between
under the public certiﬁer (CSG >C S R >C S P).
(ii) If the monitoring cost is suﬃciently high, i.e., M ∈ (c MR,M max), consumers’ surplus
under the public certiﬁer and the NGO are equal and higher than the respective one under the
private certiﬁer (CSG = CSR >C S P).
25(iii) If the monitoring cost takes its maximum permissible value (Mmax = FP), consumers’
surplus is equal across all three certifying institutions (CSG = CSR = CSP).
The intuition behind these results goes as follows. Recall from Proposition 5 that for all






12(1+γ)2. Hence, the CSR eﬀort-related
part of consumers’ surplus is, at least, as high under the NGO than under the public certiﬁer,
with the latter being always higher than that under the private certiﬁer. Recall also that the





qR¢2 ≥ (1 + γ)
¡
qG¢2 (see Proposition 6 i & ii). It turns out that the output eﬀect
is always dominated by the CSR eﬀort eﬀect. As a consequence, if M<c MR,t h eN G Oi s
the most preferable certifying institution from the consumers’ point of view. While for higher
values of the monitoring cost, the NGO and the public certiﬁer are equivalent, and both of
them are preferable to the private certiﬁer.
Regarding total welfare, our ﬁndings are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 8 (i) If the monitoring cost is suﬃciently low, i.e., M<c MR:
(ia) Total welfare is always higher under the public certiﬁer than under the private certiﬁer
and the NGO.
(ib) Total welfare is higher (lower) under the private than under the NGO if and only if
the monitoring cost is low (high) enough, i.e., M<f M (M>f M).
(ii) If the monitoring cost is suﬃciently high, i.e., M ∈ (c MR,M max), total welfare under
the NGO and the public certiﬁer are equal and higher than the respective one under the private
certiﬁer (TWR = TWG >TWP).
(iii) If the monitoring cost takes its maximum permissible value (Mmax = FP), total welfare
is equal across all three certifying institutions (TWR = TWG = TWP).
Intuitively, we know from Proposition 6 (i & ii) that for all 0 ≤ M<M max, industry
gross proﬁts under the private certiﬁer are the highest across all three certifying institutions.
In addition, they are, at least, as high under the public certiﬁer than under the NGO. As
expected, the relatively higher industry gross proﬁts under the private certiﬁer are dominated
by the relatively higher consumers’ surplus under the public certiﬁer and as a consequence,
total welfare is higher under the public certiﬁer. A similar reasoning applies when we compare
26the NGO with the public certiﬁer, with the only exception when the monitoring costs are high
enough, in which case the two certifying institutions lead to the same welfare level.
Interestingly, our analysis suggests that if the monitoring cost is low enough, i.e., M<f M,
total welfare is higher under the private certiﬁer than under the NGO. This is explained as
follows. For low values of M, industry proﬁts are maximized under the private certiﬁer and
are signiﬁcantly higher than those under the NGO who does not care about ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The
negative eﬀect of the NGO on proﬁts does not compensate for its positive eﬀect on consumer’s
surplus and as a consequence, total welfare is higher under the private certiﬁer. In contrast,
for high values of the monitoring cost, the NGO is forced to set the certiﬁcation standard at a
level that satisﬁes the ﬁrms’ participation constraints. In this case, the NGO’s positive eﬀect
on consumer surplus more than compensates the negative eﬀect on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, leading thus
to higher total welfare under the NGO.
7 Extensions - Discussion
In this section we examine a number of modiﬁcations of the basic model in order to brieﬂy
discuss the robustness of our main results.27
7.1 Timing of Certiﬁcation
I nt h eb a s i cm o d e lw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h ec e r t i ﬁer sets the CSR certiﬁcation standard before
ﬁrms decide whether to undertake CSR eﬀorts complying with this standard or not (ex ante
scenario). We now consider the case where the CSR standard is set ex post. In this scenario,
ﬁrms undertake their CSR activities in the ﬁrst stage, and in the second stage the certiﬁer
sets the CSR standard and examines whether the ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts comply with it. In the
last stage, ﬁrms compete in the market by setting their quantities. The solution of the ex-post
certiﬁcation game is summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 9 When the CSR certiﬁcation standard is set after ﬁrms have undertaken their
CSR activities, all certifying institutions (private, public, NGO) set the standard at a level
27For each extension discussed below, the detailed analysis is available from the authors upon request.
27s∗ = 1
4c. This is the equilibrium level of CSR eﬀorts that each ﬁrm undertakes and corresponds
to the level of CSR eﬀorts that maximizes each ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
O b s e r v et h a ti nt h eex post certiﬁcation scenario, the CSR certiﬁcation standard of all
certifying institutions is equal to the standard set by the private certiﬁer in the ex ante scenario
(s∗ = sP). Regarding the private certiﬁe r ,t h ei n t u i t i o ng o e sa sf o l l o w s . A si nt h eex ante
scenario, here too, the private certiﬁer’s objective coincides with the maximization of ﬁrms’
extra proﬁts from their CSR activities. Hence, in the second stage, the private certiﬁer sets
the certiﬁcation standard at a level equal to that already chosen by the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage.
Regarding the public certiﬁe ra n dt h eN G Oi nt h eex post scenario, the intuition goes as
follows. In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms set their proﬁt-maximizing CSR eﬀorts, s∗ = 1
4c. In the second
stage, neither the public certiﬁer nor the NGO has incentives to set the CSR standard at a
level higher than the CSR eﬀort level undertaken by the ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage. By doing
so, ﬁrms would be unable to be certiﬁed and hence, there would be no credible information
disclosure to consumers regarding the ﬁrms’ CSR activities. Now since ﬁrms’ CSR eﬀorts result
in consumers’ surplus and total welfare higher than the respective ones under no CSR (see
Proposition 2), both the public certiﬁer and the NGO are better oﬀ by setting the certiﬁcation
standard at a level equal to the ﬁrms’ proﬁt-maximizing CSR eﬀort undertaken in the ﬁrst
stage. Interestingly, this ﬁnding suggests that under both a public certiﬁer and a NGO, market
and societal results crucially depend on whether certiﬁcation takes place before or after ﬁrms’
CSR eﬀorts.
7.2 Price Competition
I nt h eb a s i cm o d e lw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tﬁrms compete in quantities. Consider now the case
where ﬁrms compete in prices. Keeping all other modeling speciﬁcations ﬁxed, we ﬁnd that our
results remain qualitatively robust under this scenario too. In particular, we reconﬁrm that
under all three alternative certifying institutions: First, ﬁr m sh a v ea l w a y si n c e n t i v e st oe n g a g e
in CSR activities complying with the standard. Second, consumers’ surplus and total welfare
are higher than the respective ones under no-certiﬁcation. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that the NGO
always sets the certiﬁcation standard at the level satisfying the ﬁrms’ participation constraint.
This occurs because consumers’ surplus turns out to be always increasing in CSR eﬀorts. Here
28too, the CSR standard is the lowest under the private certiﬁer, while it is higher under the
NGO rather than under the public certiﬁer, except if the monitoring cost is suﬃciently high,
i.e., MB ∈ (c MB
R,M B
max), in which case these two are equal.
7.3 Multiple Certifying Institutions
In the basic model we have assumed that only one among the three alternative certifying
institutions is active in each case. Assume now that all three certiﬁers are active and set their
CSR certiﬁcation standard simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage. In this case, each ﬁrm has the
opportunity to choose among the three certiﬁcation standards. Our analysis suggests that
each ﬁrm would choose to certify its CSR eﬀorts by the public certiﬁer because this results
in the highest net proﬁts from certiﬁcation. Only if the monitoring cost is suﬃciently high,
i.e., M ∈ (c MR,M max) for Cournot and MB ∈ (c MB
R,M B
max) for Bertrand, the public certiﬁer
and the NGO result in equal net proﬁts and hence, ﬁrms will be indiﬀerent among these two
certifying institutions.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have investigated the impact of alternative certifying institutions on ﬁrms’
incentives to engage in costly Corporate Social Responsibility activities as well as their relative
market and societal implications. We have considered three certifying institutions: a private
certiﬁe rs e e k i n gt om a x i m i z ei t so w np r o ﬁts, a public certiﬁer that maximizes total welfare and
a NGO that maximizes consumers’ surplus.
We have found that under all CSR certifying institutions, ﬁrms, seeking for competitive
advantage, undertake CSR eﬀorts complying with the standard set, in order to credibly dis-
close information to consumers regarding their products’ SR attributes. Yet, the equilibrium
CSR certiﬁcation standard depends crucially on the certifying institution. In particular, the
standard under the NGO is higher or equal to that under the public certiﬁer, which is always
higher than that under the private certiﬁer. Regarding output level and gross proﬁts this rank-
ing is reversed. Certiﬁcation of CSR activities is welfare enhancing for consumers and ﬁrms
and thus, policy makers should take measures to promote certiﬁcation. We have also identiﬁed
29circumstances under which equilibrium market and societal outcomes under the public certiﬁer
are equal to the respective ones under the NGO. Interestingly, if the certiﬁcation takes place
after ﬁrms’ have undertaken their CSR activities (ex-post scenario), the market and societal
outcomes under all certifying institutions are equal those under the private certiﬁer in the
ex-ante scenario where the certiﬁcation standard is set before the ﬁrms’ CSR activities.
Our ﬁndings provide some guidelines for future empirical research regarding the eﬀects of
certifying ﬁrms’ CSR activities on market performance which, as mentioned above, is so far
scant and inconclusive. Empirical analyses should begin with a detailed study classifying ﬁrms
undertaking CSR activities according to whether they are certiﬁed or not. Then, the certiﬁed
ﬁrms should be further classiﬁed according to whether they are certiﬁed by private for-proﬁt
companies, public welfare-maximizing regulators or NGOs. A number of testable hypotheses
emerge from our analysis. First, the certiﬁed ﬁrms are expected to spend on CSR activities
more than the non-certiﬁed. A second testable hypothesis is that ﬁrms certiﬁed by NGOs are
expected to have spent the highest amounts on CSR activities, while ﬁrms certiﬁed by private
companies are expected to have spent the lowest amounts. A third testable hypothesis is that
the probability of a ﬁrm to certify its CSR activities decreases as the cost to purchase the
certiﬁcate increases.
In our analysis we have assumed that the CSR certiﬁcate is voluntarily purchased by each
ﬁrm complying with the certiﬁcation standard. An interesting direction for future research
would be to investigate how our results are expected to change in case of a third party es-
tablishing ranking for ﬁrms, with respect to the amounts invested in CSR activities. Another
direction would be to consider production and CSR eﬀort cost asymmetries among ﬁrms. Our
conjecture is that in this case, asymmetric outcomes in which some ﬁrms certify their CSR
activities, while others do not, could emerge in equilibrium (as e.g. in Bottega et al., 2009 and
Bonroy and Constantatos, 2008).
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